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ABSTRACT Urban health promotion is not simply a matter of the right interventions, or
even the necessary resources. Urban (and indeed global) health depends to an
important extent on governance, the institutions and processes through which societies
manage the course of events. This paper describes the concept of governance,
distinguishing between reforms aimed at improving how government works and
innovations that more fundamentally reinvent governance by developing new
institutions and processes of local stakeholder control. The paper highlights strategies
urban governors can use to maximize their inﬂuence on the national and international
decisions that structure urban life. It concludes with some observations on the
limitations of local governance strategies and the importance of establishing a
Bvirtuous circuit[ of governance through which urban dwellers play a greater role in
the formation and implementation of policy at the national and global levels.
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INTRODUCTION
It is proving difﬁcult to promote a high-level and fair distribution of health in the
world_s rapidly growing urban settings.
1 Urban health promotion is not simply a
matter of the right interventions, or even the necessary resources. Urban (and indeed
global) health depends, to an important extent, on governance, the institutions and
processes through which societies manage the course of events. There is a growing
literature on governance and its impact on health.
2–5 More importantly, people
throughout the world are experimenting with governance strategies to improve
urban life. This paper draws on a thematic review of urban governance innovation
prepared for the Knowledge Network on Urban Settings of the WHO Commission
on the Social Determinants of Health (CSDH).
6 Here we describe the concept of
governance, highlight exemplary innovations and describe strategies urban
governors can use to maximize their inﬂuence on the national and international
decisions that structure urban life. We conclude with some observations on the
limitations of local governance strategies and topics for further study.
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i154GOVERNANCE AND THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS
OF HEALTH
Governance is Bthe management of the course of events in a social system.^
7 In the
urban setting, it is Bthe sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public
and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city.^
8 Responsible,
capable and fair public institutions continue to be vital to good governance, but
governance cannot be understood as the work only of government.
9 Governance is
polycentric, distributed among multiple organizations exercising diverse forms of
power. States do not enjoy a monopoly on governance, and themselves are often
governed by non-state actors.
10,11 Governance thus comprises both institutions and
procedures formalized inconstitutions and laws, and the many institutions—corporations,
NGO coalitions—and methods of power—bribery, media campaigns—that are only
obscured by equating governance with government.
Students of governance increasingly emphasize complexity, both of contem-
porary social and economic systems and of the governance networks that have
emerged to manage them. Governance is understood not as an orderly, stable
political science but as an art, a dynamic process of collective social improvisation
in which a plethora of actors are striving to organize matters for their own
advantage. BGovernance^ should therefore not be mistaken for Bgood governance.^
Any given contemporary governance system may be inefﬁcient, corrupt or
unresponsive to the needs of the governed. Aside from efﬁciency in delivering good
results, good governance is commonly deﬁned in terms of practical virtues rooted in
human rights and the principle that governors derive their authority from the
people. These include participation, fairness, decency (the degree to which rules are
formed and implemented without humiliating or harming particular groups of
people), accountability, sustainability and transparency.
8
Governance has always developed as an adaptation to social conditions. This
process of adaptation has produced some marvelous and durable institutions,
practices and norms, but it cannot be expected that governance solutions devised
in 1648 or 1787 or even 1948 will in every case be adequate to the conditions of
the present.
12 Even the best forms of governance can be worn down by the
unrelenting efforts of competing factions to game or capture the system.
7 Leading
thinkers on governance have criticized the tendency to treat past ways of
delivering good government as the only possible forms, emphasizing the need for
Bdemocratic experimentalism^ and institutional innovation.
11–13 Innovation is
crucial because the prevailing design principles of democratic governance—like
separation of powers, or even a written Constitution—Bare losing their
vitality.^
12 Real governance may so differ from the formal rules that Bthe formal
local government decision-making process may be largely irrelevant to what
actually happens.^
14 For some, taking complexity seriously means embracing the
polycentric character of governance and designing governance systems that
emphasize social learning and coordination rather than centralized, top-down
management.
11,15 One of the most important consequences of recognizing
governance beyond government is the possibility of applying the norms that have
traditionally constrained only states to powerful private governors. In a world in
which multinational corporations and wealthy foundations may wield as much
power over certain decisions as governments, people are beginning to ask whether
and how private governors can be required to be fair, transparent and
accountable.
16
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inﬂuence the social determinants of health.
2,4 In the CSDH_s view, the level and
distribution of health in a population depend on social and environmental factors
operating at various levels of social organization and unfolding over time.
17
Governance reﬂects social structure and acts as one of the social mechanisms that
sort people to unequal health outcomes by upholding existing distributions of
resources like power, money and knowledge.
18 Those with the power to shape
events in the community are able to organize matters in ways that beneﬁt them and
externalize undesirable effects on those less able to exert inﬂuence.
19 Participation
in governance is at once a function and a catalyst of people_s empowerment, and
can therefore be seen as a pathway Blinking autonomy and social engagement to
health.^
20 Although data on the link between politics, policy and health are limited,
there is some evidence that countries controlled by political parties with more
egalitarian ideologies tend to have more economically redistributive policies and
more equitable health outcomes.
5 There is also evidence suggesting that participa-
tion in governance may be healthy for individuals and communities.
21
THE LANDSCAPE OF GOVERNANCE INNOVATION:
FROM REINVENTING GOVERNMENT TO REINVENTING
GOVERNANCE
Our paper for the CSDH examined cases of governance innovation in areas like
policing, sanitation and housing. We divided what we saw into two categories,
Breinventing government^ and Breinventing governance.^ Reinventing government
involves efforts to recalibrate traditional state institutions and practices to improve
their capacity, often paradoxically by ceding the implementation of policy to non-
state actors through devices like governance partnerships, self-regulation, and the use
of markets as regulatory tools (for example, environmental emissions trading
schemes).
22,23
Many reinventing government schemes have been linked to a problematic
neoliberal, smaller government ideology, and experience with measures like the
privatization of water and sewer systems has not been entirely happy.
24 We also
found many instances of government reinvention that seemed to promote good
government and healthy public policies. Participatory public expenditure manage-
ment (PPEM) is an excellent example.
25 Over the last two decades, participatory
budgeting—in which citizens take part in budget planning, overseeing public
expenditures, and monitoring delivery of goods and services—has grown from a
Brazilian experiment to an international model for socially accountable urban
governance.
26 The reform of land-tenure registration systems is another example.
Uncertainty about ownership and tenure deprives poor people of the opportunity to
convert property into capital for investment or home improvement, and undermines
the incentive to improve housing stock and neighborhood amenities.
27 Reforms in
property governance have simpliﬁed title registration systems and zoning rules.
28
Similar efforts have been made to eliminate bureaucratic barriers to small business
entrepreneurship.
29
Reinventing governance aims more broadly to mobilize governors with little or
no connection to the state.
10,12,13 Innovation has entailed developing new institutions
and new tools of governance that can be placed at the disposal of stakeholders acting
independently of or even in competition with traditional government institutions.
These typically involve NGOs deploying Bsoft^ strategies like information sharing
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Health report
30) but also harder market strategies like voluntary product certiﬁcation
schemes.
31 Our review found many successful examples in the urban setting.
Community organizations have performed well in developing water and sewer
systems, garbage collection, and local health promotion programs.
32–34 Indeed, the
World Development Report in 2006 called community participation Bprobably the
biggest inﬂuence on the success—or failure—of public sanitation facilities.^
35
Unsatisfactory results from a Thai government housing improvement program in
the 1990s led to the creation of an independent public agency, the Community
Organizations Development Institute (CODI). CODI has a partnership structure,
with a board of government and civil society representatives, but works primarily
through organizations and networks in the target communities that plan and
implement housing upgrades in their own neighborhoods. As of the end of 2004,
upgrading programs were proceeding on this model in 175 communities involving
more than 14,000 households.
36
The landscape of governance is littered with governance deﬁcits, gaps between
people_s stake in governance and their access to governance institutions.
37 Many
governance innovators have focused on developing models of governance that
ensure that people have Bsubstantial and equal opportunities to participate directly
in decisions that affect them.^
7,14,38 What has been called Bmicrogovernance^
involves seeding communities that have been excluded from governance with small
institutions around which people can mobilize their knowledge and capacity.
3 In
South African townships, residents provide dispute resolution and community
development services that traditional state bodies were failing to deliver through a
new institution called the Peace Committee. In India, health promotion for sex
workers has been built around collectives like the Durbar Mahila Samanwaya
Committee in Sonagachi.
39 New governance practices like these not only change
how speciﬁc activities are managed, but also potentially the dynamics of the larger
urban governance system.
INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES FOR URBAN GOVERNANCE:
HEALTHY AND POWERFUL CITIES
Urban governors do not control many of the important determinants of urban well-
being, from the amount of the national budget available to meet urban needs to the
business decisions of leaders in the global economy. Reinventing urban governance
for health is in practical terms a project of the weak. In the urban setting, it turns on
poorer residents gaining a greater share of control and resources. At the national
and global levels, it turns on local governors_ ability to inﬂuence the upstream
determinants of their situation. John Braithwaite has described a set of strategies
that the winners in the global game of governance have used to advantage
themselves, and asked how these methods of power used by the strong might be
adapted by the weak.
37,40 In this section of the paper, we apply these strategies to
healthy urban governance.
1. Build and rebuild institutions of governance to increase participation and
effectiveness.
Those who have little must manage what they have well. The traditional basics of
good government remain crucial: accountability, transparency and honesty.
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structures is also fundamental, although decades of effort have not produced a
generally applicable solution.
41 New governance strategies of privatization and self-
regulation can be tools of more efﬁcient public management. PPEM, community
policing and other practices that increase the meaningful involvement of stake-
holders have shown good results, but do not replace and indeed may depend on the
vitality of governance institutions outside the government. Funding (and minimiz-
ing legal barriers on) NGOs, microgovernance initiatives and institutional
innovations that devolve power to stakeholders can all increase urban governance
capacity by mobilizing the resources and capacities of communities that currently
have no real access to governance.
2. Network governance.
Once a wide range of governance institutions are active, building connections
among them and with compatriots in other urban settings allows the weak to
increase their resources for advocacy and upstream governance. Networks like the
Asian Coalition for Housing Rights and Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI)
not only take local action but also Bwork together to support each other—from
community to community within cities, from city to city within nations, and
internationally.^
42(p 2),
43–45 The Healthy Cities Movement and regional health
promotion networks, through which areas in close geographic proximity pool
resourcesandexpertise,exemplifythetypeofcooperationnecessarytoglobalhealth.
46
3. Concentrate technical competence at network nodes.
Effective networks of governance typically create nodes on the network that
Bconcentrate resources and technologies for the purpose of achieving a common
goal.^
7,47 Technical expertise and the capacity to rapidly gather, interpret and
respond to information helps weaker actors compete successfully with stronger
ones.
37 The campaign of developing countries and HIV/AIDS advocates to mitigate
the impact of the TRIPS agreement on access to essential medicines demonstrated
the importance of organizing networks around institutions of technical competence
such as Medecines sans Frontieres and the Consumer Project on Technology.
48
Another example is the health promotion foundation, like VicHealth in Australia,
designed as a reliably funded source of expertise and advocacy in the cause of better
health governance.
49
4. Focus on forums where urban governors can be creative and assertive.
Many powerful governing institutions and systems are not concerned about the
welfare of urban settings. BIf weak actors engage in governance in and through
organizational nodes that others, particularly rich and powerful others, have
established and work through, they will typically ﬁnd themselves at a disadvantage
because they will ﬁnd that the agendas of others have been built into nodal
processes.^
37 BForum shifting^ may be deﬁned as relocating interactions (like
negotiation or regulation) from an institution of governance in which an actor
encounters resistance to one where it is likely to achieve its objective. Forumshifting
has been an extremely useful tool of the powerful; it can also work for weaker players
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ﬁle law-suits against gun makers in places where provincial and national legislatures
have rejected gun-control regulation.
50 PPEM creates a new forum for spending
decisions in which non-state actors have more authority in relation to local
government ofﬁcials.
51 NGOs like Peace Committees and water cooperatives also
represent a forum shift: unsatisﬁed with the services they are getting within a scheme
of government provision, they create a new service-providing institution in which
they have greater control over processes and outcomes.
5. Have a responsive regulatory strategy.
This is a generic Bbest practice^ of power in any forum. Responsive regulation
entails using the least expensive and intrusive form of action needed to secure
compliance.
52 Dialogue is more efﬁcient than threats; threats are more efﬁcient than
actually imposing sanctions. But as Braithwaite points out, a responsive strategy is
more than good technique: it has two even deeper virtues. First, it represents a way
of understanding governance in a democracy based on Bresponding to peoples_
problems, environments, demands.^ The obligation to respond to others in the
society is a vital example of the relational Bchecks and balances^ that constrain
power in a polycentric governance system. Second, responsiveness embodies the
capacity for learning and the openness to new information that are characteristic of
effective governance institutions.
53
6. Have a big stick and threaten to use it.
Even responsive regulators sometimes crack down hard. Urban communities are
weak in relation to national governments, multinational corporations and interna-
tional donors, but they are not powerless. Urban governors have a variety of sticks,
from networked advocacy and shaming strategies, through regulations and taxes, to
debt default. BWeak^ actors have proven reasonably effective at inﬂuencing global
policy not just by speaking up for the interests of poorer regions in international
fora, but by taking the battle into the media and domestic politics.
40
CONCLUSION: CHALLENGES OF HEALTHY URBAN
GOVERNANCE
Strong local governance has its pitfalls.
54,55 Those with greater resources of
experience, money or skill can game the local system as they can a national
government.
56 The voices of the poorer, weaker, more socially marginal can be
ignored. Women may be denied the chance to speak at all. Urban settings often
have large populations of Billegal^ internal or international migrants whose right to
participate is contested.
57 Urbanites do not necessarily, or even most of the time,
organize themselves and vote as urban dwellers, but rather act as members of
ideological or ethnic blocks organized around national political issues that may
reﬂect and worsen divisions at the local level.
14
Urban governors are part of a system that works best as it approaches the ideal
of a Bvirtuous circuit^ (see Figure 1). At any level of social organization, governing
institutions require the capacity to mobilize and coordinate local resources, but
from a global governance perspective, vertical coordination and participation are
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national, provincial and especially the local institutions of governance are bypassed
or lack the capacity for effective implementation. Even the imposition of Bgood^
solutions in a top–down manner, without real decision-making participation by
those most affected, is paternalistic and illegitimate from a democratic perspective.
Good governance requires the interplay of power and constraint to forestall
dysfunctional phenomena such as capture. Good national and international gover-
nance can be a source of norms, and a recourse for those excluded from local decision
making.
55 National governments provide the Bpolicy environment^ in which local
government and governance can innovate, or not.
58,59 It is not even clear that
empowering urban areas leads to greater attention to urban inequities: BAlthough
central governments are unlikely to be generally more Fpro-poor_ than local govern-
ments, it may be easier for central governments to insist on pro-poor use of grant
resources than for local governments to use their own resources in that way.^
14(p 14)
Local governments typically are short not just on cash but on properly trained
bureaucrats with the skills and incentives to use their power productively. The
strategies we have discussed here are hardly new to local health advocates; the
problem is that lack of resources can limit efﬁcacy at every step. Improving skills in
governance, widening the repertoire of strategies, will make poor urbanites more
effective, but local governors also need access to the resources controlled by higher
levels of governance.
The promotion of innovation in healthy urban governance will beneﬁt from a
signiﬁcant investment in research and practice. On the research side, more support is
requiredfor the studyoftheBdesignprinciples^ orgrammarsofsuccessfulgovernance,
particularly outside of and in partnership with government.
60 It is even more
important tofund governance Bentrepreneurs^reinventinggovernanceincommunities
around the world, and to support ongoing community processes of governance
reinvention. Investment is also necessary to sustain and build on success. Even
successful models of participatory governance—and there are many—remain Bfeel
good^ stories for researchers, governments and NGOs unless they can be replicated at
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FIGURE 1. The virtuous circuit of global health governance.
BURRIS ET AL. i160a sufﬁcient scale to inﬂuence the condition of the mass of urbanites.
58,61 International
funders and governments speak about the importance of good governance and strong
civil society, but investment in general governance capacity, unlinked to a particular
categorical program or speciﬁc objective, is still too rare.
People can learn to better improvise, but no amount of research or technology
transfer will turn governance from an art into a science. It will be difﬁcult to prove
that any particular form or process of governance causes urban health to improve,
yet we have more than enough reasons to prefer good governance over the
alternative. Good governance is not just valuable for the ends it promotes, but for
the process of collective cultural imagination it represents. Urban settings are places
where the world can be re-imagined, where efforts at reform create the context for
new ideas and further action, and where new norms are formed.
62,63 The world_s
urban settings present an enormous opportunity to deﬁne and implement healthy
public policy through governance innovation.
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